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Most accounts of contemporary Irish culture tend to be largely affir-
mative, even Whiggish, in cast. The contemporary cultural moment is recur-
rently described as one characterized by renaissance, experiment, and
iconoclasm, a moment vitalized by the emergence of radical new voices,
styles, media, forms, and energies. This upbeat view is clearly underpinned
by a broader sociohistorical narrative, also of a decidedly Whiggish tem-
per, in which contemporary Irish society is construed as one engaged over
recent decades in an often laborious, but on the whole overwhelmingly suc-
cessful, overcoming of a more repressive, provincial, censorious past. As
Irish society leaves behind that past to become more liberal, secular, post-
nationalistic, multicultural, more confidently European in its outlook, con-
temporary Irish culture—the account runs—gives imaginative expression to
this dynamic process of social change.
The very concept of what I have been referring to as ‘‘the contem-
porary cultural moment’’ presupposes some kind of watershed that allows
us to distinguish between ‘‘the way things are now’’ and ‘‘the way they were
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before.’’ In most of the surveys that document the achievements of the pres-
ent, however, it is precisely the absence of any serious attempt to estab-
lish what (if indeed anything) is decisively new about the present cultural
moment that is most conspicuous. Every decade will produce its own cul-
tural novelties (one recalls Walter Benjamin’s remark that ‘‘fashion is the
eternal recurrence of the new’’), but in this restricted sense no decade can
be considered qualitatively different from any other, and by such measure
the 1980s and 1990s are no different, say, from the 1940s or 1950s. Yet when
commentators discuss contemporary Irish culture, they generally appear
to make some stronger claim for the present than the mere fact of novelty
in this basic sense. The usual claim is that the emergence of new women
writers, of the new urban writing, and the successes of the Irish film or music
industries collectively amount to something more significant than the peren-
nial turnover of personnel and seasonal fashion.
The point I am arguing here is that any strong conception of ‘‘the con-
temporary moment’’ is always defined in terms of a break with or modifica-
tion of the cultural system that preceded it. Such claims presuppose some
kind of literary periodization, some implicit model of cultural history, but sur-
veys of contemporary Irish culture have tended to evade explicit theoretical
engagement with such tasks. Onemight even argue that the (now extended)
Field Day Anthology has furnished Irish studies with something like a viable
canon of Irish literature (one that is, to be sure, like all canons, gapped, ten-
dentious, and contested), but that we still lack seriousmaterialist attempts to
historicize Irish literary and cultural production. Marxist critics have always
had a special commitment to the historical analysis of culture, notably the
ambitious models of cultural history developed by such leading figures as
Georg Lukács and Fredric Jameson. It is no exaggeration to say that the
historical schemata that underpin their works have become something like
the assumed ‘‘common sense’’ of much leftist cultural criticism and thus will
be broadly familiar.
The difficulty with the historical schemas developed by Lukács and
Jameson is that they cannot easily be transposed onto the Irish situation.
Whatever their differences otherwise, these Marxist cultural histories are
elaborated with a metropolitan European or Euro-American capitalist his-
tory in mind. Lukács’s work takes its bearings primarily from French and
German (and to a lesser extent English and Russian) literary history; Jame-
son’s addresses itself to a continental Western European (England, France,
Germany) and U.S. context (though his later work tries to extend the frame).
From well before the modern period, however, Irish history had evolved in
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ways that did not conform in some decisive respects to developments in
the metropolitan cultures that inform Lukács’s or Jameson’s works. To begin
with, Ireland had escaped the conquest of Roman imperialism, in contrast
to most of Western Europe, and was, in Brendan Bradshaw’s words, ‘‘no
more than superficially touched by the cultural and institutional cargo’’ which
that empire brought with it.1 It was out of that institutional cargo that medi-
eval European feudalism emerged when the Roman Empire collapsed, but,
with the exception of the areas controlled by the Anglo-Norman invaders in
the south and east, the feudal system never substantially penetrated Ire-
land. Later, in the modern period, when other Western European countries
such as Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, France, Belgium, and eventually
Germany became, each for a time at least, successive centers of capitalist
and imperial expansion, Ireland was the only country in that geographical
area to be subjected to a sustained, thoroughgoing, and culturally traumatic
experience of colonization. For its nearest neighbors, modernity was syn-
onymous with the assumption of key structural positions in the emerging
capitalist world system, with the accumulation of wealth, monopolization of
the means of violence, national aggrandizement, and the sense of cultural
distinction that attended this.
For Ireland, in contrast, modernity meant dispossession, subordina-
tion, and the loss of sovereignty, the collapse of its indigenous social order,
the gradual disintegration of the Gaelic cultural system, and successive
waves of politically or economically enforced emigration. Capitalist moder-
nity in Ireland, in other words, advanced within a colonial regime under
which the country remained the most chronically unstable and rebellious
location within the British archipelago from the early modern period until the
late twentieth century. Whereas other Western European economies were
dramatically transformed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by
the first and second industrial revolutions, most of Ireland remained non-
industrialized, and its economy continued to be, until very recently, unusu-
ally dependent for a Western European region on export-oriented agri-
cultural production. The colonial legacies of economic subordination and
dependency, technological underdevelopment, massive emigration to the
industrial centers of Britain and the United States, and sectarian violence
inscribed in a postcolonial partitionist state order have conditioned much of
the shape and texture of twentieth-century Irish history.
1. Brendan Bradshaw, ‘‘Irish Nationalism: An Historical Perspective,’’ Bullán: An Irish
Studies Journal 5, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 2000): 5.
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Because Marxist models of history have assumed as normative the
transition from feudalism via absolutism to mercantile and, later, industrial
capitalism, or a series of structural modulations within capitalism of the
kind described by Ernest Mandel, Irish history has always proved quite
recalcitrant to conventional Marxist emplotment. To take a particularly
vivid example, when mid-nineteenth-century English capitalist development
issued in the Industrial Revolution that made Great Britain ‘‘the workshop
of the world,’’ Ireland was devastated by the social catastrophe of the Great
Famine. While one society, in other words, was being transformed by devel-
opments that would bring it to the apex of its industrial and imperial glory,
the other was being transmogrified by what we might call an early Victo-
rian holocaust.2 Nevertheless, while this massive discrepancy in national
experience speaks for itself, the real challenge posed by these concurrent
developments is to conceive of them not as two altogether alien and disjunc-
tive histories but rather as two divergent vectors of the same modernization
process. The particular theoretical challenge of the Irish situation, in other
words, is to be able to deal with the ways in which the country has devel-
oped by capitalist modernizing processes quite different from those in the
major metropolitan European and American countries, while simultaneously
allowing for the fact that its distinct development has always been shaped
and conditioned by capitalist developments in these core areas. The chal-
lenge, in other words, is to steer a course between a Scylla that would simply
stress Ireland’s sameness to the metropolitan states, thereby effacing differ-
ence to press Ireland into a standard metropolitan template, and a Charyb-
dis that would stress only its fundamental alterity (its exceptional or anoma-
lous or aberrant elements) to the metropolitan centers.
To say that Ireland’s condition has been one of ‘‘colonial peripherality’’
is not at all to suggest that it has developed somewhere entirely beyond the
pale of metropolitan modernity. On the contrary, to be peripheral is precisely
to be compelled to develop within constraints, sets of forces, and agendas—
economic, political, cultural, intellectual—that have largely been prescribed
or conditioned by developments in the metropolis. To think beyond current
orthodoxy in Irish social and cultural history—which usually construes Ire-
land as only badly and belatedly catching up with a model of modernization
immaculately completed much earlier in Europe—we need to work toward
2. The term alludes to Mike Davis’s remarkable Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Fam-
ines and the Making of the Third World (London: Verso, 2001), which suggests that the
Irish Faminemight be viewed as an early precursor to a wider global series of late Victorian
modernizing catastrophes.
Cleary / Materialist History of Twentieth-Century Irish Literature 211
a less linear and more global and conjunctural mode of analysis that starts
from the assumptions that Irish modernity comprises a particular configu-
ration of wider global processes, and that its modernity is therefore directly
coeval with other modernities. But coeval here suggests a contemporaneity
that recognizes the possibility of difference.
In this essay, I want to take a long view of twentieth-century Irish liter-
ary and cultural history by situating that history in terms of a wider metropoli-
tan European and Euro-American transition from modernism to postmod-
ernism of the kind theorized by Marxist critics such as Jameson and Perry
Anderson. Though Jameson’s work on modernism and postmodernism is
the much better known of the two, Anderson’s will also be considered here
because it has usefully ‘‘rewritten’’ Jameson in ways that attempt to reinsert
social and political levels that Jameson’s work, focused overwhelmingly as it
is on cultural developments as a response to changes in the economic base,
generally overrides. To many Irish critics, a venture of this kind will seem
quixotic and misconceived. For some, the value of such large-scale histori-
cal frameworks will seem unconvincing, tidying the interesting messiness
of Irish cultural history into an overly orderly succession of cultural domi-
nants. For others, the canonical bent of literary histories of this sort will, not
unjustifiably, raise questions. For still others, what is really called for is an
entirely new kind of cultural history less indebted to Eurocentric Marxian
metanarratives.
While the project envisaged here undoubtedly remains vulnerable
to these criticisms, it is questionable whether it could ever be possible to
elaborate an entirely new model of cultural history that would avoid all of
these pitfalls. Of these various critiques, the most urgent one claims that
the Eurocentrism of Marxist cultural criticism cannot but conscript Irish
cultural history into an apparently metropolitan register that is really only
a provincially Western European or Euro-American one, and in so doing
simultaneously impedes the development of a genuinely global frame of
reference capable of embracing locations beyond Europe. It is undoubtedly
the case that while we have had many studies of, let us say, the Irish Revival
that always implicitly compare it (usually negatively) with other contempo-
rary Western European modernisms, that Revival might look very different
indeed were we to think of it more in terms of other broadly contemporary
cultural and intellectual ‘‘renaissances’’ elsewhere, such as, for example,
those in Bengal, Harlem, or Mexico. For the moment, however, the research
and resources that would make this kind of usefully estranging project pos-
sible are still underdeveloped. In any event, the issue is not whether we situ-
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ate Irish cultural history in a European context or a more broadly colonial
and global one; the real question is how best to do both.
My working assumption is that while the works of Western Marxists
such as Jameson and Anderson are indeed problematically Eurocentric,
and ought not, by anymeans, to be slavishly adapted to Irish circumstances,
Ireland nonetheless does not exist somewhere entirely ‘‘outside’’ of the his-
tories of capital and culture theorized by these Marxist cultural historians.
The history of Euro-American capital and culture, in other words, is not the
universal history Marxists have taken it to be, but that history has nonethe-
less impressed itself on developments in most parts of the world, and more
heavily on Ireland, perhaps, because of its location, than on many other
colonized regions.
2
In Mandel’s Late Capitalism, modern capitalism is deemed to have
passed through three successive long economic cycles and systemic muta-
tions, each characterized by its own distinct technologies, labor regimes,
and sectoral dominants.3 Jameson’s work rests on the idea that these three
phases can be correlated to threemajor aesthetic dominants or macrostruc-
tures he calls realism, modernism, and postmodernism. The idea of an aes-
thetic ‘‘dominant’’ here refers to a cultural ascendancy that will never exhaust
the entire phase in question but that designates, rather, the most novel and
salient aesthetic forms of any period. The dominant aesthetic mode of a
particular period, therefore, will always coexist with residual, contrapuntal,
and emergent modes, as well, though the cultural dominant will, as Michael
Walsh puts it, occupy ‘‘the hegemonic high ground within a given society at
a historical moment.’’4 Radical breaks between one period and the next are
not conceived as involving complete changes of content but rather as the
restructuring of a certain number of elements already given: features that in
an earlier period or system were subordinate now become dominant, and
features that had been dominant again become secondary.5
The function of any decisive cultural transformation, Jameson con-
3. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1975).
4. Michael Walsh, ‘‘Jameson and ‘Global Aesthetics,’ ’’ in Post-Theory: Reconstructing
Film Studies, ed. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1996), 482.
5. Fredric Jameson, ‘‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society,’’ in Modernism/Postmod-
ernism, ed. Peter Brooker (London and New York: Longman, 1992), 177.
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tends, ‘‘will be to invent the life habits of the new social world,’’ to ‘‘de-
program’’ subjects trained in an older formation, and to provide imaginary
resolutions to the contradictions and antinomies that constitute specific
social contexts. Viewed thus, nineteenth-century ‘‘realism’’ was not simply
an artistic copy or passive reflection of nineteenth-century society; its praxis,
rather, was to de-program the older providential and sacred narratives of
the precapitalist period and to provide new cultural paradigms of the sub-
ject’s relations ‘‘to what now comes to be thought of as reality.’’6 To under-
stand realism, therefore, we must grasp it as a component of the vaster
historical project of the bourgeois cultural revolution, in which the whole
economico-psychic structure of feudalism was dismantled and a new bour-
geois economico-psychic subjectivity installed in its place. For Jameson, the
essential task of the realist novel is twofold: on the one hand, to critique and
corrode the sacred narratives of the older medieval world; on the other, to
produce the new secular and disenchanted object world of the commodity
system, the world of which it will then claim to be the ‘‘realistic’’ reflection.7
Modernism, for Jameson, is a cultural mode that emerges at a later
moment, when capitalism dramatically extends its global reach (via imperi-
alism), but when, nonetheless, ‘‘the technologically (or socially) modern was
still little more than an enclave; in which the country still coexists with the
city and still largely outweighs it.’’8 As Harry Harootunian puts it, glossing
Jameson, it was the spectacle of lived unevenness in both the political, eco-
nomic, and sociocultural domains that allowed modernism to develop, and
it was the lived experience of this ‘‘simultaneous non-simultaneity’’ (Ernst
Bloch) that modernism took as its predicate and problematic.9 Modernism,
in sum, is a term that designates the matrix of possible aesthetic responses
to a capitalist moment defined by this clash between old and new; it cor-
responds to the lived experience of the uneven temporalities of ‘‘simulta-
neous non-simultaneity.’’ In his earlier writings, Jameson stresses that both
modernism andmass culturemust be conceived as dialectical counterparts.
Whereas mass culture succumbs to the logic of the commodity (though not
6. Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (London and New York: Routledge, 1990),
164–66.
7. Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1981), 152.
8. Cited in Santiago Colas, ‘‘The Third World in Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, The Cul-
tural Logic of Late Capitalism,’’ Social Text 10 (1992): 261.
9. Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Inter-
war Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), xxii–xxiii.
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without retaining some muted capacity to express dissatisfied desires and
utopian longing), the formally difficult experiments of modernism represent
a desperate attempt to outflank the commodification process—though the
price for this was that modernism lost touch with (and indeed mostly wanted
to escape) the wider publics to which the great realists still had access.10
For Jameson, the postmodern is ‘‘what you have when the capitalist
modernization process is complete.’’ 11 This moment is reached when capi-
talism has finally attained global reach, either abolishing all remaining pre-
capitalist modes of production or subsuming them within its compass, and
when it has also penetrated the unconscious and hence become normal-
ized to the extent that we find it increasingly difficult to imagine either pre- or
postcapitalist forms of existence. Jameson accepts that there is consider-
able formal, stylistic, and even thematic continuity between modernist and
postmodernist cultural practice. But he insists that, despite such similarities,
what matters is that cultural production is positioned and functions differ-
ently in the modernist and postmodernist periods, since, with the extension
of commodity logic, the older distinctions between high and mass culture
have now largely collapsed. In the postmodern period, the disintegration of
unified subject positions, already symptomatically beginning to come apart
in modernism, is now completed. This condition is generated not only by
the dissolution of the unified bourgeois subject of early capitalism, however,
but also by the disarticulation of any unified class subject as well, and the
consequent elaboration of dissent in more fragmented, localized, and iden-
titarian forms. Jameson does allow for some remaining pockets of resis-
tance within the postmodern moment—identified with the underclass ghet-
tos of the advanced capitalist world and with peripheral ‘‘Third World’’
formations—but these are not seriously or systematically integrated into his
larger theory.
The relationship between the economic and cultural spheres is not
conceived by Jameson as one of base-superstructure reflection; culture
serves, rather, as a means of transcoding the dominant mode of production,
so that the mediations between the two spheres become a central issue in
his work. Nevertheless, even if Jameson allows for what Walsh calls ‘‘the
complex semiautonomy of the cultural,’’ 12 because it is premised on track-
10. Fredric Jameson, ‘‘Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,’’ in Signatures of the Visible,
9–34.
11. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), ix.
12. Walsh, ‘‘Jameson and ‘Global Aesthetics,’ ’’ 484.
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ing the relationship between cultural production and very large-scale eco-
nomic changes, the absent intermediate level in his work tends to be the
political. In this respect, at least, Anderson’s attempts to theorize modern-
ism and postmodernism in terms of a complex conjuncture or intersection of
diverse sociopolitical and economic forces represent a useful supplement to
Jameson’s model. One of Anderson’s key concepts is that of the ‘‘conjunc-
ture’’: a term that denotes the exact balance or configuration of forces, and
the overdetermination of the contradictions that obtain within that balance,
that can be said to constitute a particular historical moment.
For Anderson, it is significant that the most extensive European mod-
ernist movements emerged in the early twentieth century not in the most
industrially advanced or most ‘‘modern’’ country of the time—England—but
rather where complex conjunctures allowed for ‘‘the intersection of differ-
ent historical temporalities.’’ 13 Modernism, he argues, emerged in continen-
tal Europe within a cultural force field comprised and triangulated by three
coordinates. The first was the codification of a highly formalized academi-
cism in the visual and other arts that drilled students in the major styles
and masterpieces of the classical or neoclassical past. These academies
were the cultural gatekeepers of states still massively dominated by aristo-
cratic or landowning classes, which, though economically in relative decline,
were still setting the political and cultural tone in the European countries
before and even after World War I. The second coordinate was the incipi-
ent, hence essentially novel, emergence within these still largely preindus-
trial societies of the key technologies or inventions of the second industrial
revolution: the chemical and synthetic industries, electric power, turbines,
internal combustion engines, the telephone, radio, cinema, the automobile,
the aircraft. Mass consumption industries, Anderson contends, were not yet
implanted anywhere in Europe, however. A third decisive coordinate was
the imaginative proximity of social revolution. In no European country at the
start of the twentieth century was bourgeois democracy completed in the
sense that adult suffrage was extended to all (women and many workers did
not have the vote), and the insurgent labor movement still remained largely
outside of the political system and had yet to be co-opted as a political force.
The extent of hope or apprehension about revolution varied widely across
Europe, but it was everywhere ‘‘in the air’’ during the belle epoque and espe-
cially after the Russian Revolution. Across Europe, then, the Old Order still
13. Perry Anderson, ‘‘Modernity and Revolution,’’ in Marxism and the Interpretation of Cul-
ture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988), 324.
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clung on tenaciously in both the political and cultural spheres, but it was
everywhere shadowed not only by the sweeping changes triggered by the
still infant second industrial revolution but also by the specter of political
revolution, and hence the moment was pervaded by a sense that the future
was radically open-ended.
What was the specific contribution of each coordinate to the wider
force field defining modernism? For Anderson, the persistence of the ancien
régimes and the concomitant academicism of the state cultural institutions
provided a key range of cultural values against which the modernist move-
ments could define themselves. Without this common adversary, the wide
range of new modernist artistic practices had little unity: it is their com-
mon hostility to the consecrated neoclassical, romantic, and realist canons,
and to the cultural mortmain of the ancien régime academies and conser-
vatories, that constitutes their identity as such. But if they rejected official
academicism, many different modernist movements also rejected the com-
modity market as the alternative organizing principle of culture and society.
If nothing else, the Old Order offered a conception of art as a higher voca-
tion (predicated on conceptions of value at odds with capital logic) that
was still available to the modernist artist. Finally, the combined stimuli pro-
duced by the wave of technological advances that defined the second indus-
trial revolution and by the prospect of revolution lent the period an electric
atmosphere—oscillating between apocalyptic anxiety and utopian hope—
in which it was possible to imagine a wholly transformed social order utterly
unlike that which currently existed.
3
If, as Anderson suggests, modernist cultural currents were strongest
not where industrialization and the new corporate capitalism were already
most advanced but in situations of combined and uneven development,
where relatively small industrial enclaves were hatched within an older
aristocratic or predominantly agrarian and preindustrial order, then Ireland
accords with this profile well enough. Late nineteenth-century Ireland pos-
sessed an unusually modernized state (itself a product of colonial rule),
strong basic literacy levels in European terms, and Belfast was then the
world’s fifth largest industrial city. Nevertheless, on the island as a whole,
the economy and workforce were still overwhelmingly rural, artisanal, and
preindustrial. For many, a direct link can be traced between this retarded
industrial and technological development and the supposed conservatism of
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Irish cultural production in the Revival period. In ‘‘The Archaic Avant-Garde,’’
for instance, Terry Eagleton argues that Ireland in this period was every bit
as much a capitalist formation as its British counterpart, but that the Irish
variety ‘‘was a woefully inert form of rural capitalism, an old-fashioned form
of modernity.’’ Moreover, he contends, the prime mover of modernization in
Ireland was ‘‘the rural middle class’’ (‘‘one of the most conservative forma-
tions in Western Europe’’), and that class ‘‘lacked the challenge of an indus-
trial working class to spur it into life.’’ 14 ‘‘There could be,’’ he concludes, ‘‘no
exhilarating encounter between art and technology in such an industrially
backward country.’’ 15
But Eagleton here seems to assume too automatic and unmediated
a connection between economic base and culture. It is as though a largely
rural society and rural middle class must inevitably produce a reactionary
ruralist culture. Yet, as Anderson points out, it was precisely in the least
industrially advanced European societies—namely, Italy and Russia—that
the most militantly antitraditionalist modernist movements emerged, as
exemplified by the Italian Futurists and the Russian Constructivists. But if
these overwhelmingly rural countries produced militant avant-gardes that
hymned technology and industrial transformation, this begs the question
why something of this kind did not also occur in Ireland, where the industrial
northeast might have functioned as crucible and stimulus in a manner not
unlike, say, the industrialized north in agrarian Italy.
The answer here surely has to do not just with a rural middle class
per se but with the vagaries of Ireland’s colonial history, which had simulta-
neously transferred most of the Irish Catholic laboring classes abroad (by
the 1860s, New York already had a larger Irish population than Dublin) and
rendered the industrial northeast the most determinedly counterrevolution-
ary region in the entire island. Because of its fierce antipathy to Irish nation-
alism, and indeed to its supposed liberal allies in England, the northern Prot-
estant industrial bourgeoisie and working classes had embraced the most
conservative and chauvinistically imperialist versions of British identity and
ideology.16 The industrialized northeastern economy centered on Belfast,
moreover, was tied integrally to the British economy, and while Britain had
been the heartland of the first industrial revolution, its global preeminence
14. Terry Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture (London and
New York: Verso, 1995), 277.
15. Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger, 299.
16. See Gillian McIntosh, The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Twentieth-Century
Ireland (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999).
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was actually threatened by the second, which allowed rivals such as Ger-
many and the United States to emerge as new superpowers on the inter-
national scene. Hence, while in what had earlier been industrially backward
places, such as Germany, Russia, or Italy, the second industrial revolution
might generate a heady welter of excitement as they began to ‘‘catch up’’
with Britain and with each other, in Britain itself, the same developments
augured a sense of imperial crisis and national decline.
Thus in an early twentieth-century context, when Britain was still the
world’s leading industrial superpower, the Belfast shipyards could produce
themighty ocean liners that were one of themajor icons of twentieth-century
technological daring and ambition. But the sinking of the Titanic, the mass
slaughter of the Ulster regiments on the Somme in 1916, and the shrinkage
of the Union due to Irish nationalist separatism collectively helped to ensure
that in Unionist-dominated northern Ireland, as in Britain more generally,
early twentieth-century modernity was culturally conceived of in terms of
catastrophe, collapse, and decline—in terms of the sense of an ending—
rather than in rhapsodic or euphoric terms. In other words, in the industrial-
ized northeast of Ireland, the advent of the twentieth century gave rise to a
cultural posture of defensive siege largely inhospitable to the development
of modernist art forms.
Thus, in Ireland the most industrialized enclave and the most sub-
stantial industrial working class were peculiarly aligned with the forces of
British imperial tradition and counterrevolution, and hence did not produce a
cultural modernist efflorescence of the kind that issued from other European
industrial enclaves also encased within largely agrarian societies. It is also
true that the technological advances of the second industrial revolution only
lightly affected the island of Ireland as a whole. In the Irish situation, the dis-
combobulating force that Anderson ascribes to this technological revolution
had already been effected instead by a very different route: that is, by the
devastation of the Great Famine. The effect of the second industrial revolu-
tion in Europe, as Anderson and others have suggested, was to corrode the
old social order, dissolving its precapitalist elements, imploding traditional
forms of everyday life and installing in their place new work practices, new
modes of transport and communication, new kinds of social space, new gen-
der relations, and so on. Decades before the second industrial revolution
and the Great War did their work in continental Europe, the Famine in Ire-
land had arguably represented a merciless and accelerated convulsion of
this magnitude, decimating the subaltern classes, accelerating the exodus
from the land to the core industrial centers of England and America, com-
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pelling a shift to very different new property regimes at home, and, not least,
dealing a final death blow to Gaelic culture. In 1849, William Wilde, father of
Oscar, wrote that the Famine represented a ‘‘great convulsion which society
here of all grades has experienced, the failure of the potato crop, pestilence,
famine, and amost unparalleled extent of emigration, together with bankrupt
landlords, pauperizing poor-laws, grinding officials, and decimating work-
houses, have broken up the very foundations of social discourse. . . . In some
places, all the domestic usages of life have been outraged; the tenderest
bonds of kindred have been severed, some of the noblest and holiest feel-
ings of human nature have been blotted from the heart, and many of the
finest, yet firmest links which united the various classes in the community
have been burst asunder.’’ 17 In Wilde’s account, we find that same simulta-
neously dazed and amazed rhetoric, the same shocked sense of just how
quickly the most sacrosanct bonds of a whole society can be shredded by
an overwhelming force that is also registered in the famous ‘‘all that is solid
melts into air’’ passage penned a year earlier by Marx and Engels in The
Communist Manifesto. An estimated four million people left post-Famine Ire-
land between 1855 and 1914; this ‘‘headlong exodus’’ has been described
by one leading present-day historian as ‘‘the instinctive reaction of a panic-
stricken people to the spectacle of their traditional way of life breaking into
pieces before their very eyes.’’ 18
But for good reason the actual cultural dynamics of that event played
out differently in Ireland than in other peripheral European societies. For the
Italian Futurists and Russian Constructivists, the new technology of the sec-
ond industrial revolution incited a sense of radical right- or left-wing fervor
because it promised to dynamite a pathway to the future for societies that
felt themselves smothered under the sheer excess of ossified ancien régime
tradition. Technology, it was thought, would liberate these second-rate Euro-
pean powers from the mortmain of the once-glorious pasts that by the early
twentieth-century seemed merely to be excess baggage that retarded their
progress into the future.
In late nineteenth-century post-Famine Ireland, in stark contrast, the
decisive preoccupation was not with how to discard the excess baggage
of a once-splendid past but with the need to salvage something from the
veritable wholesale decimation of tradition. Where for the Futurists mod-
17. William Robert Wilde, Irish Popular Superstitions (Dublin: J. McGlashan, 1852), 9–
11. Cited in George Denis Zimmerman, The Irish Storyteller (Dublin: Four Courts Press,
2001), 208.
18. F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London: Fontana, 1985), 44.
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ern Italy had to blast its way out from under the opulent rubble of imperial
Rome and the Renaissance to enter modernity, in Ireland the whole drive
was not to shake off a once-glorious-now-moribund past but to recover or to
invent an indigenous culture almost totally obliterated by centuries of colo-
nialism, anglicization, and famine. To put it very simply, the Futurists might
have felt that Italy was smothering under the excessive encumbrance of
their once-glorious heritage, but, for the Irish, the real dilemma was that so
much of the native heritage had already disappeared. At the distance of but
a single generation from the lived trauma of the Great Hunger, a collective
drive was under way to salvage something from the last great decimation
of Gaelic culture in order to rebuild Ireland anew in terms that would not
simply be British. The massive building program undertaken by the Catholic
Church in the post-Famine decades, the campaign for a Catholic university,
the establishment of the Gaelic Athletic Association (1884), the National Lit-
erary Society (1892), the Gaelic League (1893), the cooperative movement
(1894), and the Irish Literary Theatre (1899) all belong, in discrepant and
often fiercely antagonistic ways, to this wider institution-building drive that
would issue in the creation of a new Irish state and social order. The Revi-
val, therefore, is best seen not as a singular phenomenon but as a matrix
of cultural responses to this wider post-Famine institution-building drive to
create hegemonic national institutions and a national public, and it was in
turn both out of—and also in reaction to—the cultural ferment created by the
intersection of these broad popular movements that the modernist strands
of the Revival would emerge.19
Given the context, the whole drive of the Revival was not so much to
assault the existing network of venerable national cultural institutions in the
manner of the European avant-gardes as to create the stately institutions
the country was felt to lack, and in so doing to transform Dublin from a British
satellite into an Irish cultural capital. Whereas in the established European
states the modernist avant-gardes rebelled against the stifling atmosphere
of their own prestigious national academies, in Ireland the cultural revolu-
tion took on, rather, the character of a dispute between literary core and
periphery. The Irish Revivalists challenged London’s cultural dominance in
two ways: either by staying at home to establish Dublin as a rival cultural
capital (Yeats, John Synge, and Augusta Gregory), or by bypassing London
19. For some pioneering attempts to connect the Revival to the Famine, see Luke Gib-
bons, ‘‘Montage, Modernism, and the City,’’ in Transformations in Irish Culture (Cork: Cork
University Press, 1996), 165–69; and Kevin Whelan, ‘‘The Memories of ‘The Dead,’ ’’ Yale
Journal of Criticism 15, no. 1 (2002): 59–97.
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altogether and migrating instead to Paris (Joyce, Beckett), thereby insert-
ing Ireland into the mainstream of European culture from which centuries of
British rule were felt to have had detached it. However much the Revivalist
and the more vanguard wings of the ‘‘Irish Renaissance’’ may have differed
otherwise, both were searching for an alternative to what they saw as the
genteel philistinism of English Victorian culture.
For many Irish scholars—whether liberal or leftist, republican or re-
visionist—the most embarrassing aspect of the Revival is its folk culture
idiom, its nativist or romantic nationalist tones, its ‘‘backward look’’ to the
western seaboard or to imagined worlds of the Irish peasantry or of Celtic
epic and saga. All of this lends Revivalist literature an archaic coloration dis-
tinctly at odds with conventional ideas of modernism as the brashly icono-
clastic and cosmopolitan art of new times, new cityscapes, new materials,
new technologies. In other words, if we take the ‘‘shock of the new’’ as the
defining signature of modernism, then the Revivalist neoromantic celebra-
tion of the peasantry, the countryside, the Big House, all seem to be dis-
tinctly at odds with the modernist currents of the time.
But here again one has to assess the Revival in terms of the avail-
able cultural resources and longer cultural history out of which it emerged.
European ancien régime ‘‘high culture’’—the cultural matrix out of which
European modernism developed and against which it rebelled—had its ori-
gins in the court cultures of the Renaissance and thrived thereafter under
the patronage of the churches and the big and small absolutist states. The
ballet, the opera, architecture, sculpture, the visual and performing arts all
flourished in Europe within the carapace of the great continental absolutist
courts—Bourbon, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanov—and a host of minor
central European courts, such as, most famously, Weimar or Bayreuth. Ire-
land was geographically on the periphery of this continent: it had no indige-
nous feudal or court culture of its own, and from early modern times it was
under the colonial rule of the one major European country (England) that
had the shortest-lived absolutist state, a constitutional monarchy with little
power, and hence perhaps a court culture that was, by continental stan-
dards, rather undistinguished. The English court or state never matched the
achievements in classical music, ballet, opera, or the visual or fine arts that
its European counterparts did. England’s major field of cultural achievement
in the nineteenth century was in literature, and especially the novel; in nearly
all of the other ‘‘high’’ arts (and the novel before its high modernist eleva-
tion was itself a ‘‘popular’’ rather than ‘‘high’’ art form) it trailed in the wake
of its continental rivals. Anglo-Irish Dublin after the Union survived only as
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a declining satellite of this culturally unspectacular center, while Ireland’s
indigenous ‘‘high’’ Gaelic culture was arrested in its development by suc-
cessive waves of colonization that demolished the Gaelic-speaking aristoc-
racy and led to the suppression of the majority Catholic Church, a possible
alternative source of patronage, until the nineteenth century. Without major
institutions of aristocratic or ecclesiastic patronage, a ‘‘high’’ Gaelic intel-
ligentsia or culture could not thrive, and over the centuries all aspects of
that indigenous culture were subsequently reduced, as is common in colo-
nial situations, to the status of a ‘‘folk culture’’: a culture valued more for
its ethnographic interest, and the access it supposedly afforded to the van-
ishing past, than for its capacity to speak to the present. Since this meant
that the Irish Revivalists, unlike the European modernists, had very little
indigenous or vernacular post-Renaissance ‘‘high culture’’ of their own with
or against which to work, it was scarcely surprising that they turned to folk
and peasant materials, or to the premodern saga and epic literature of the
pre-Christian past.
Nor was this turn to the countryside and the indigenous pagan or
‘‘deep’’ past for inspiration as utterly alien to other early European modern-
isms as some rather stereotyped conceptions of modernism would suggest.
In France, for instance, the Impressionists conducted one of the earliest
modernist rebellions against fossilized academic conventions, but Impres-
sionist canvases were largely directed to the world of peasants, autumnal
harvests, and the countryside rather than to that of cities and proletari-
ans. When they did paint cityscapes, the Impressionists recorded artisanal
markets and the boulevard cafés and leisure worlds of the Parisian petite
bourgeoisie rather than the turbulent ultramodern landscape of the sec-
ond industrial revolution. In Germany, Wagner’s Ring cycle (1876) broke
with nineteenth-century German operatic convention and paved the way
for the emergence of modernist music, but the Wagnerian Gesamtkunst-
werk looked to the world of pagan epic, medieval chivalry, and heroic emo-
tion rather than to the contemporary industrial world for inspiration. In bal-
let, Stravinsky’s The Firebird (1910) and Le Sacre du Printemps (1912),
produced for Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes, represented a shocking break with
established conventions, but these works were deeply influenced by Rus-
sia’s contemporary revival of folk culture rather than the new world of the
factory, technology, ormetropolis. Even in advanced industrial England, sev-
eral of the most modernist writers—Joseph Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, T. E.
Lawrence—drew more heavily for inspiration on the exotic and ‘‘primitive’’
outposts of empire rather than on the modern metropolis. In ‘‘the colonial
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world,’’ too, as in Latin America, for instance, the first phase of modernism
tried to reconcile the experimental advances of European vanguards with
indigenous Aztec, Mayan, and peasant iconography.
In a variety of ways, then, a fascination with ‘‘primitive’’ cultures
serves as a fundamental modernist stimulus (as the classics were to the
Renaissance) through which to assault the perceived deficiencies of the
modern world.20 The point for our purposes is that the late nineteenth-, early
twentieth-century turn by Standish O’Grady, Yeats, Gregory, Synge, Patrick
Pearse, Douglas Hyde, and the other Revivalists to what they took to be the
premodern world was not totally out of step with other contemporary forms
of early modernism. In Ireland, however, as in Russia, instead of seeking
renewal among ‘‘primitive’’ cultures at the outer perimeters of empire, writers
and artists looked to their own ‘‘primitives’’ at the domestic perimeters to
serve as a spiritual counterresource to what they took to be the defilements
of industrial and commercial civilization. If this turn to precapitalist aristo-
crat and peasant cultures, in Ireland as elsewhere, was often shot through
with a reactionary worldview, then a more militantly experimental modern-
ism that embraced technology, the machine, and the city was no guarantee
of a progressive art or politics, either. Italian Futurism, to cite the obvious
example, embraced the brave new world of the twentieth century with a mis-
sionary zeal, but while the Futurists attacked the monarchy and the Vatican,
they also denigrated parliament and socialism, and trusted extreme Italian
nationalism, imperialism, and war to blast the way to the future, whatever the
human cost. In other words, the embrace in modernist hands of the archaic
premodern worlds of aristocracy, epic past, and rural countryside or that of
the metropolis and technology can be equally reactionary. What is politically
decisive is not whether a modernist writer embraces the archaic or the mod-
ern elements—the country or the city—on this spectrum but rather how the
dialectic between the two is elaborated in his or her work.
When Eagleton concludes, then, that ‘‘what is striking about Irish
modernism is its overwhelmingly conservative tenor,’’ arguing that the coun-
try was too rural and too technologically backward to produce a radical
avant-garde on the continental European model, since ‘‘[t]here could be no
exhilarating encounter between art and technology in such an industrially
backward nation,’’ the problem is not so much that this verdict is too harshly
20. See Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990); and David Richards, Masks of Difference: Cultural
Representations in Literature, Anthropology, and Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
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negative (though it may be: when seen in a world-colonial context and
not under exclusively Western eyes, the Irish Revival would prove tremen-
dously inspiring—as the Harlem Renaissance and other episodes would
suggest). The problem with the verdict, rather, is that it rests on a whole
series of suppositions that need to be, but are not, critically tested. Working
within a social formation that was neither continental European nor Anglo-
American in character, and thus lacking both the stimulus of the extensive
ancien régime high cultures of the former fully as much as the economico-
technological dynamism of the latter, Ireland nonetheless produced several
great modernist writers—first Synge and Yeats, then Joyce, later Beckett—
who managed between them to span three successive phases or genera-
tions of European literary modernism. If in the works of the earliest of these
modernists—Synge and Yeats—the dialectic between the archaic and the
modern tended to be weighted toward the archaic, which was associated
with value, and to denigrate the modern, equated with the loss of value,
then this seems largely in keeping with a great deal of early or pre–World
War I European modernism, when a strong sense of aristocratic disdain for
the new society emerging out of the collapse of the old remained decisive.
In Joyce’s Ulysses, the same tension between the archaic and the mod-
ern remains fundamental. It is no longer manifest, however, in terms of a
rivalry between premodern and modern cultural formations as in Yeats or
Synge, but is reconfigured instead in terms of the tension between the mod-
ern city’s complex geographic strata and multitemporalities and the mythic
method designed to lend that landscape some sense of totalized form. But
Joyce’s work has already shifted the weight decisively toward the ‘‘mod-
ern’’ rather than the ‘‘archaic’’ end of the spectrum by moving his art away
from the rural landscapes of his precursors and into a wholly urban Irish
milieu, and by embracing the encyclopedic but mock-epic and post-heroic
forms typical of modernism at its post–World War I meridian. In the post–
World War II work of Beckett, defined partly by his attempt to move beyond
Joyce (as Joyce’s was to press beyond Yeats’s), the city in turn is aban-
doned for a null, devastated, shell-shocked, postapocalyptic, posthistorical
wasteland, in which the whole project of modernity has already proleptically
played itself out to a catastrophic denouement, and in which the detritus of
the modern has consequently itself become archaic. Eagleton concludes
that what unites these works is their common mandarinism and hence con-
servatism (there is, after all, no engagé such as Brecht on the Irish scene—
though in this assumption, Eagleton, like everyone else, overlooks Mair-
tín Ó Cadhain, surely the most politically committed of the Irish modernist
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writers, his work regularly bypassed, however, because he wrote in Irish
rather than in English). But what seems much more remarkable is the intel-
lectual radicalism that drives the successive bearers of Irish modernism to
work their way—with the relentlessness of a computer virus—through all of
the major variations that the dialectic of the modern and the archaic (a dia-
lectic constitutive of modernism tout court) will yield. In the works of the Irish
modernists, that dialectic will continuously be extended and assaulted until,
between them, the whole repertoire of ‘‘solutions’’ it will yield is exhausted
or exploded.
While these writers produced several of the most challenging mod-
ernist masterpieces in the English language, the country still produced no
extended modernist culture. This was not because Ireland was a premod-
ern or traditional rural backwater too isolated from the rapids of twentieth-
century modernity to do so, but because it was in one broad sociohistorical
sense too modern, since it had been, via colonialism, catapulted directly
into modernity without ever having passed through the feudal stage and
hence had so little of the vernacular ‘‘high culture’’ that many of its Euro-
pean neighbors had to work on. To put this otherwise, while in Europe it
would take two world wars decisively to liquidate the hoary but obdurate old
universe of the ancien régime, in Ireland, the late nineteenth-century Land
Acts (which issued from the class struggles of the Land Wars) consigned
the local aristocracy to their doom several decades earlier than the power
of their counterparts in England and much of Europe would be dissolved.
The attainment of bourgeois nationalist independence in what is now the
Republic, moreover, took most of the island out of the titanic wars of self-
destruction that devastated much of the rest of continental Europe until the
1950s. A less conservative, less isolationist, and more engaged twentieth-
century history might have produced the social convulsions which might
in turn have stimulated a more extended modernist culture, but if the Free
State established a conservative society, that very conservatism bought its
own shelter from Europe’s successive plunges into self-destruction.
In the end, what distinguishes Irish modernism above all else from
its European counterparts was not perhaps that it was on the whole much
more or less conservative than other modernisms in other national contexts
but that its literary modernism began so early21 and still managed to extend
itself across several successive stages of modernist literary development,
21. See J. C. C. Mays’s introduction in Poems and Exiles, by James Joyce (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1992), xl–xli.
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yet without ever reaching much beyond literature. Except for a very mod-
est modernism in painting—like literature, the most small-scale, individual,
and artisanal of art forms—there were no substantive or extended mod-
ernist movements in Irish architecture, music, dance, sculpture, or munici-
pal design. The experimental thrust of Irish modernism—in Wilde, Synge,
Yeats, Sean O’Casey, Joyce, Beckett, and Ó Cadhain—was essentially lin-
guistic in character, and it was in the carnival of language that the uto-
pian dimensions of the Revival and the national struggle found sanctuary.
While the fact that Irish modernism was so concentrated in literature may be
explained partly as a response to a sense of linguistic alienation in English
aggravated by the loss of Gaelic Irish culture, and partly due to the fact
that literature is less immediately dependent on other large-scale political
and economic institutional supports and constraints than other art forms—
such as architecture, sculpture, or cinema, for example—this also ensures,
however, that literature cannot so immediately translate its visions into the
everyday lifeworld as these other media do. Because it was so confined to
high literature, Irish modernism was inevitably, at a time when the bulk of the
population had access only to primary education, largely divorced from the
everyday lives of the broader Irish public. A modernism in cinema, music,
architecture, public design, or the performing arts might have engaged pub-
lic consciousness in more immediate ways than Ulysses or Yeats’s late
poetry or Endgame could ever expect to do. Ireland, then, had an exuber-
ant literary modernism that survived across several generations, but already
by the late 1920s, when the Irish revolution had petered out in a conserva-
tive partitionist state order on the island, that modernism was increasingly
achieved not only in the geographical distance of European self-exile but
at an emotional distance from the social movements and stimuli that had
provided its initial momentum in the first instance.
4
For Anderson, as indeed for Jameson, it is the gradual disintegra-
tion of the coordinates that had sustained the modernist cultural field that
has prepared the ground for the contemporary (post-seventies) ascendance
of postmodernism. As Anderson conceives it, modernism continued as a
defining cultural force until World War II, which delivered the final death-
blow to the old agrarian and aristocratic elites and their way of life all across
Europe. World War I had already mortally maimed these classes, but their
traditional rival, the haute bourgeoisie, struggled to maintain the distinc-
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tive social and cultural universe of the old order for another twenty years,
until it also began to dissolve as a class. The suggestion is not that class
divisions have diminished since World War II or that overall levels of class
mobility have significantly increased; what has changed, however, Ander-
son asserts, is that the sense of cultural distinction that characterized the
old elites has dissolved in the new conditions of mass consumerism that
developed in Western Europe in the contemporary period. In this situation,
the old split between high and popular culture that had rested on the sepa-
ration between well-educated elites and illiterate or semiliterate majorities
began to lose its force. High culture is now cultivated by fractions of the
university-educated bourgeoisie and middle classes, while the majority of
all classes, rich and poor, are now attached to the mass entertainments of
the culture industry.22 For long, Anderson argues, sociologists have debated
the embourgeoisment of the European working classes, but in ‘‘a monetary
world that knows no social fixities or stable identities,’’ the encanaillement of
the possessing classes represented the more significant phenomenon.23 In
a context where the old academicist establishments and the narrow bour-
geois mentalities against which it rebelled have both lost their force, mod-
ernism has lost much of its coherence and shock value, and can no longer
maintain the oppositional stance it had once claimed (OP, 86).
Secondly, whereas modernism had thrived on the excitements of the
technological advances of the second industrial revolution, technological
innovation acquired a more baleful cast by the second half of the century,
with the invention of the atom bomb and the inauguration of the Cold War: in
this climate, the malevolent specter of technological apocalypse had largely
eclipsed the technological utopianism of the early twentieth century. More-
over, the most decisive technological advance of the postwar era, Anderson
contends, was television, and especially color television, which only became
generalized in the 1970s. TV and the new computer and digitalized com-
munications technologies, he suggests, following Jameson, are essentially
technologies of reproduction rather than production. Thus, the crucial differ-
ence between the wave of technological innovations released by the sec-
ond industrial revolution and those of the late twentieth-century communi-
cations revolution was that the earlier innovations were themselves silent.
22. On this topic, see Néstor Garcia Canclini, ‘‘Latin American Contradictions: Modernism
without Modernization?’’ inHybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 58.
23. Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (London and New York: Verso, 1998),
85. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically in the text as OP.
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They had to be represented by other arts; they could not represent them-
selves. The new discourse- and image-producing technical environment of
the postmodern is such, however, that all the arts are now increasingly can-
nibalized and mediated by these new communications technologies (OP,
87–89).
Of the enabling conditions for modernism, the last to disappear was
the specter of revolution. This, too, did not disappear overnight; it continued
to haunt the post–World War II period, and, in the late sixties, the conjunc-
ture of student and worker strikes across Western Europe, decolonization
movements in the Third World, and the apparent prospect of a revitalized
Communism after Stalin, together with the sexual revolution, created a revo-
lutionary ferment not seen since the twenties. But this conjuncture proved a
short Indian summer, and by the seventies the Right resumed control with
Thatcher and Reagan. By the end of the eighties, Soviet Communism had
collapsed, the Third World anticolonial revolutions had failed to deliver eco-
nomic emancipation, the welfare state created by postwar social democ-
racy in Western Europe was downsized, and the triumph of neoliberalism
seemed assured.
It is, Anderson argues, in this new conjuncture that the new postmod-
ernist field emerges into view. ‘‘Postmodernism emerged from the combina-
tion of a declassé ruling order, a mediatized technology, and a monochrome
politics’’ (OP, 92). Capitalism itself, he adds, entered a new phase after the
postwar boom ended, characterized by the assault on organized industrial
labor in the capitalist cores; by outsourcing to peripheries of the world sys-
tem; by the dramatic rise of finance capital and exchange speculation rela-
tive to manufacturing; and by the vulgar nouveau riche consumerism and
hedonism that has dominated the eighties and nineties. ‘‘The departure of
aristocracy, the evanescence of the bourgeoisie, the erosion of working-
class confidence and identity, have altered the supports and targets of artis-
tic practice in fundamental ways. It is not that alternative addressees have
simply disappeared. New poles of oppositional identification have emerged
in the postmodern period: gender, race, ecology, sexual orientation, regional
or continental diversity. But these have to date constituted a weaker set of
antagonisms’’ (OP, 104).
The postmodern cultural moment, for Anderson, lacks both the
towering individual geniuses or the intransigent collective vanguard move-
ments of the modernist period. Where new avant-gardes do appear, they
are incorporated into the commodity market with unprecedented rapidity.
Whereas the modernists had tended, broadly speaking, to ally themselves
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either with the élan of the old aristocracy or with the egalitarian dreams of a
still-emergent, still-radical labor movement, or even in some instances with
both, in the altered conditions that constitute the postmodern, the possibili-
ties of imaginative investment in either the upper atmosphere of titled leisure
or the lower dreams of manual labor have receded.
If these vectors of alterity are not available to postmodernism, which
ones are? Here Anderson finds a model in Antonio Gramsci’s concep-
tion of the European Renaissance and Reformation. Intellectually and aes-
thetically, the Renaissance was far in advance of the Reformation, but the
Reformation, culturally coarser, more philistine and obscurantist, was a
conservative reaction that nonetheless yielded a historical advance. The
Renaissance had been an elite affair, confined to wealthy educated minori-
ties; the Reformation involved half the common population of Europe. So
although the Reformation coarsened and simplified the High Renaissance
assault on medievalism, the passage of intellectual advance through the
ordeal of popularization ultimately put the advances made by the Renais-
sance on a stronger and freer social foundation.
Can this Gramscian model of dilution and diffusion describe the rela-
tionship between modernism and postmodernism? Jameson’s early work
on postmodernism, Anderson believes, had intimated something of this
kind. Increased levels of educational access and higher literacy, new infor-
mation technologies, a more universal dependence on wage labor had,
Jameson suggested, created something of a leveling process: not democ-
ratization, but nevertheless a kind of ‘‘plebianization’’ of high culture that the
Left could only welcome. Viewed thus, postmodernism could be regarded
to some extent as a welcome popularization of modernist sensibility and
techniques. Anderson considers this idea, but ultimately rejects it, since he
believes that the analogy with the Reformation will not hold. The Reforma-
tion, he argues, was a political movement of convulsive energy, unleash-
ing civil wars all across Europe; it was an ideological insurgency against
the premodern ideological order of the universal church. The period since
the seventies has seen enormous global change, but the triumph of neo-
liberal capitalism has only rarely been something won by bottom-up popu-
lar struggle; mostly it has been compelled by top-down economic pressure
mediated through international agencies servicing the interests of global
capital (OP, 112–14).
Anderson does sketch, however, what he identifies as a constitutive
tension within the postmodernist cultural field, between its citra and ultra
tendencies. The citra includes all those tendencies that have tended to dis-
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pense with the more difficult and inassimilable parts of modernism to make
it more accessible; the ultra includes those tendencies that have attempted
to radicalize modernism’s negation of immediate gratification or sensuous
intelligibility. The one attempts to adjust art to the ubiquity of commodifica-
tion and the spectacle; the other attempts to elude this fate. In the post-
modernist moment, however, the weight of the ultra to citra tendencies is
clearly the inverse to that of the earlier modernist epoch, the seesaw has
titled to the other end (OP, 105–6). While it is certainly the case that much
of the ‘‘Third World’’ has far lower degrees of consumption and much less
advanced levels of technological development than those associated with
Western postmodernism, the development of global communications sys-
tems—especially television—has ensured, Anderson suggests, ‘‘an incom-
parably greater degree of cultural penetration of the former Second and
Third Worlds’’ than had been the case even as late as the sixties. In these
conditions, postmodern forms make themselves felt well beyond the rich
Western metropolitan regions, so that today there is little reason to doubt
that ‘‘even the damned of the earth too have entered the kingdom of the
spectacle’’ (OP, 122).
5
To what extent, if any, might these relief maps of the postwar metro-
politan landscape help to illuminate late twentieth-century Irish develop-
ments? Since 1958, when the Irish political elite finally abandoned eco-
nomic autarchy, the southern Irish state’s single major project has been to
integrate the country into the European Union and global capitalism. The
same period witnessed the introduction of new communications technolo-
gies, especially television, which brought the country into closer contact
with the wider international political scene and with British and North Ameri-
can consumer society. There was the early but delusive hope that eco-
nomic modernization could be achieved while maintaining intact the conser-
vative Catholic social order consolidated after independence. Confronted
since the seventies on a series of fronts—by the women’s movement, the
very different value system retailed in mass culture, and the top-down lib-
eralization of state law required by EU membership—the Catholic Church
initially rallied its forces to defeat successive attempts to loosen the bond
between church and state and to liberalize sexual mores. By the nineties,
that reactionary rally had ebbed considerably. The litany of clerical sex and
child abuse scandals dredged to light during the last decade has massively
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dented the moral authority of the Catholic Church. This had been, in any
event, weakening for some time, as more and more people simply ignored
its teachings on sexual morality. This social process is best understood per-
haps not so much in terms of ‘‘secularization’’ as in terms of a wholesale
resocialization or reengineering of Irish bourgeois subjectivity and cultural
hegemony. What has emerged in the wake of the old Catholic-nationalist
order is not somuch amore secular society as a new kind of social formation
where subjectivity is decreasingly defined either in terms of citizenship or of
adherence to communal church practices. Instead, it is increasingly articu-
lated in terms of individual capacity to participate in various modes of con-
sumer ‘‘lifestyle’’: a transformation in the technology of subject production
as dramatic and far-reaching as that inaugurated in the nineteenth-century
after the Famine.
The mediatization of Irish culture has also proceeded apace. While
colonial Ireland was only lightly touched by the first and second industrial
revolutions, and while independent Ireland circumvented, because of its
neutrality, the nuclear dimensions of what Mandel has called the third tech-
nological revolution, the country has found itself during the last two decades
(punctually, this time, no long time lag involved) a significant supply cen-
ter for what we might call, extending Mandel, the ‘‘fourth’’ (computer) tech-
nological revolution. Hence, it has been able to overcome the peripherality
suffered in earlier phases of capitalism to become a world center in the soft-
ware industry. Ireland is now the second largest exporter of software in the
world after the United States (60 percent of PC-based software in Europe
originates from Ireland) and is lauded by economists as one of the most fully
‘‘open’’ or globalized economies in the world.24
The third defining coordinate of the postmodernist conjuncture, ac-
cording to Anderson, is the exorcism of the specter of revolution and a cor-
responding diminishment of any sense of alternative futures. In the late
sixties, Northern Ireland did experience a surge of revolutionary upheaval
in the form of the civil rights campaign, which challenged Unionist domi-
nation of the North and in so doing threatened to upset the whole basis
of the post-partition state settlement. The deliberate injection of violence
into that campaign in the early 1970s, especially on Bloody Sunday, set the
scene, however, for a long ‘‘dirty war’’ that unfolded against the backdrop
of the grim international horizon of the Second Cold War. This viciously
24. Cited in Michael Cronin, ‘‘Speed Limits: Ireland, Globalisation, and the War against
Time,’’ in Reinventing Ireland: Culture, Society, and the Global Economy, ed. Peadar Kirby,
Luke Gibbons, and Michael Cronin (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 56.
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conducted struggle mobilized and politicized the Northern Catholic working
class and has impelled substantive reform of the Northern state, but repub-
lican insurgence was unable either to end partition or to overcome the divi-
sions between the Protestant and Catholic working classes, which remain
deeper than ever today.
The period since the seventies, then, has witnessed major sociocul-
tural change and massive economic transformation in the Southern state
and some substantive administrative reform in the Northern one. In both
states, however, these positive transformations have gone hand in hand
with an increasing subordination of society on the island as a whole to
the dictates of a neoliberal economic order that has actually aggravated
social inequality and led to the normalization of an individualistic consumer-
ist ethos at the expense of social solidarity. Some of the smaller left political
parties and some religious organizations have helped to temper the worst
excesses of the existing economic order. But, as is the case globally with
the Left, none has been able to articulate what the economic-cultural basis
for some alternative kind of society might be. While there is much in recent
Irish history that would require us to reject or temper Anderson’s dejected
conception of the post-seventies’ period as one characterized solely by an
unbroken litany of defeats, the very constricted sense of available alterna-
tives to the existing neoliberal economic regime is as decisive a feature of
the current sociopolitical climate in Ireland as elsewhere. Indeed, in Ireland
since the sixties—as in what was once Eastern Europe and in many places
in the erstwhile ‘‘colonial world’’ today—the surest sign of the ascendancy of
the new neoliberal regime is that the country’s ongoing integration into the
world-economic system is so widely credited as a process of emancipation
from a misguided revolutionary past.25
Nevertheless, while the coordinates of postmodernism delineated by
Anderson and Jameson identify the wider context and constraints within
which contemporary Irish cultural change can usefully be analyzed, the spe-
cific character of the Irish scene ought not to be effaced. For both of them,
as we have seen, postmodernism emerges in a cultural climate determined
primarily by the waning of an earlier efflorescence of modernism. However,
while Ireland produced, as has been noted, an ambitious literary modern-
ism, the country was in no position to support an extendedmodernist culture
beyond the literary field. In fact, even in the literary field the cultural dominant
25. The best accounts of the cultural dynamics of Irish modernization since the sixties are
Luke Gibbons’s Transformations in Irish Culture (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996), and
Conor McCarthy’s Modernisation: Crisis and Culture in Ireland, 1969–1992 (Dublin: Four
Courts Press, 2000).
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in Ireland during the decades between independence and the end of the
twentieth century was notmodernism at all but rather naturalism. Born of the
blighted dreams of the Irish revolution, this naturalism was, in essence, an
aesthetic of diminished expectations that set out to deprogram the roman-
tic utopian impulses of the literature of the Revival. Where Revivalist litera-
ture insisted on the possibility of a revitalized putatively archaic Irish culture
heroically resistant to the defilements of metropolitan modernity, naturalism
negated this utopian idealism by insisting on the dreary provincial squalor of
Irish life. In the theater, this disillusioned naturalism was already installed as
the dominant house style in the Abbey by midcentury: the reigning genres
were political farces, peasant comedies, rural and kitchen dramas. Natural-
ism’s ascendancy in poetry was marked by Patrick Kavanagh’s The Great
Hunger (1942); Kavanagh (and not Yeats) became the dominant model for
most Irish poets right into the present. In narrative fiction, the early naturalis-
tic Joyce of Dubliners and Portrait of the Artist (and not Ulysses) exerted the
most decisive and extensive influence on the development of Irish writing in
the postindependence period.
In its French inception, the naturalist novel had provoked intense
hostility because it imaginatively explored previously uncharted territories
of lower-class urban experience—slums, back streets, brothels, prisons,
asylums, and the modalities of petit bourgeois poverty and vice—and thus
offended official morality and accepted definitions of novelistic good taste.
But Irish naturalism has been concentrated (with important exceptions)
overwhelmingly in small-town and rural Ireland, the fictional territory of writ-
ers such as Kate O’Brien, Liam O’Flaherty, Sean O’Faoláin, Edna O’Brien,
John McGahern, Tom Murphy, and William Trevor. Like its French counter-
part, Irish naturalism was also in its inception a dissident and reformist aes-
thetic: it measured the distance between the official state ideology of Irish
Ireland and its tawdry reality. The naturalist writers probed—with an intimate
knowledge of the local terrain conspicuously absent in much of the litera-
ture of the Revival—the social and sexual traumas that official Irish culture
would not acknowledge, and in so doing many incurred the wrath not only
of state censors but of the reading public for scandalizing their own society
before an allegedly hostile Anglo-American audience.
But while naturalism was undoubtedly a dissident and reformist aes-
thetic, it would be difficult to regard it in retrospect as a radical one. It pro-
tested against the sordid, hypocritical, petty corruption of small-town or
rural Ireland, its cultural and libidinal immiseration. Yet, while it disclosed
the cramped lives this society afforded, it also consistently reduced—in the
manner habitual to naturalism—that society to the sordid conditions it pro-
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tested. Naturalism is a socially engaged form, but it is a literarymode usually
focalized through the consciousness of characters so socially isolated and
temperamentally alienated from their communities that any sense of social
protest is typically smothered by a pervading climate of entropy and fatalism.
In Irish naturalist fiction, protagonists usually survive their deathly social
condition only if they can escape or emigrate; to remain within or committed
to the local community is to atrophy with it.
No one can doubt that the problems depicted in naturalism were
actual and pressing; what can be questioned is the inference that the com-
munities depicted were so helplessly paralyzed, so denuded of internal dis-
sident forces and resources, as naturalism typically indicates. Stylistically
speaking, moreover, naturalism’s formal and linguistic conservatism aes-
thetically reproduced that very sense of cramped ambition and narrow limi-
tation which naturalism thematically denounced in society at large. Irish
modernism might have detached itself from social engagement and in so
doing displaced its utopian energies into linguistic and formal inventiveness;
naturalism, by contrast, remained socially committed, but its arthritic aes-
thetic conservatism inadvertently replicated the dour social conservatism of
Irish society against which it set itself.26 Thus, in many respects, the natural-
ists became a symbol of the very condition they protested. It remains today a
critical commonplace to contrast Yeats’s imaginary romantic Ireland with the
tougher-minded realism of a Kavanagh, O’Faoláin, or McGahern, but Yeats
was no less scornful of the society that emerged after independence than
they; indeed, he was perhaps even more intransigently critical and unrec-
onciled. The real difference is that while Yeats conceived of this provincial
and puritanical new Ireland as only too typical of the bourgeois-industrial
modernity he detested, the naturalists were convinced that the ills of post-
independence Ireland were to be explained, rather, by its lamentably archaic
rural social order, and that their task, therefore, was to release it into moder-
nity. Both were agreed that the new Ireland was a disappointment; where
they differed was that while Yeats attributed its shortcomings to its embrace
of the modern, the naturalists attributed the same defects to the suppos-
edly archaic character of Irish society that impeded it from fully entering the
modern.
Once the economic modernization drive of the sixties got under way,
26. For a more extended discussion of Irish naturalism, see my ‘‘Modernization and Aes-
thetic Ideology in Contemporary Irish Culture,’’ in Writing in the Irish Republic: Literature,
Culture, Politics, 1949–1999, ed. Ray Ryan (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000),
105–29.
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an extensive academic and journalistic literature emerged in Ireland that
sought to identify those cultural factors that were impeding the development
of a modern industrial enterprise culture. Fianna Fáil’s version of national-
ism, the rural ‘‘traditionalism’’ of the countryside, and the inordinate influ-
ence of the Catholic Church featured obsessively as mainstays of Irish
backwardness in this literature. In this ideological climate, the bleak con-
ception of postindependence Ireland fashioned in Irish naturalist literature
was now pressed into the service of the wider cultural program of capitalist
modernization. Since the naturalist aesthetic, like modernization discourse,
insisted on the insular, static, monochromatic, and entropic quality of post-
independence Irish life, and since mass culture offered a tantalizing vision
of the unlimited bounty of metropolitan culture, it was all too easy to market
the country’s insertion into international consumer capitalism as a veritable
ticket out of the poorhouse of independence into a carnival of libidinal and
cultural excitement.
Thus, the real cultural dominant in postindependence Ireland was
naturalism, not modernism. Hence the emergent cultural dominant of the
present moment might be described not so much as ‘‘postmodernism’’ as
a kind of neo- or postnaturalism. Some of the most internationally feted,
commercially successful, and critically debated ‘‘new Irish’’ works of the last
decade fall into a category of this sort. Brian Friel’s Dancing at Lughnasa,
Martin McDonagh’s The Leenane Trilogy, Marina Carr’s By the Bog of Cats
and On Raftery’s Hill, and Patrick McCabe’s 1992 novel The Butcher Boy,
later filmed by Neil Jordan in 1997, can all be read as signposts to the emer-
gence and consolidation of this new aesthetic trend. A parallel development
may be observed in Northern Ireland, where the more familiar ‘‘Northern
thriller,’’ romance-across-the-divide, and bildungsroman conventions con-
solidated since the seventies have been superseded in the nineties by more
ludic versions of the same genres, a trend exemplified by works such as Neil
Jordan’s The Crying Game, Colin Bateman’s Divorcing Jack, and Robert
MacLiam Wilson’s Eureka Street.27 In these works, the old naturalism has,
in recent decades, acquired the high voltage of new technical innovations,
some new Viagra of hectic experiment or extravagance, to resuscitate it into
some new life or half-life.
Of these works, Friel’s anomic Ballybeg in Dancing at Lughnasa
is closest in narrative method and milieu to the established norm of Irish
27. See Richard Kirkland’s incisive overview of contemporary developments in Northern
Irish narrative fiction in his Identity Parades: Northern Irish Culture and Dissident Subjects
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002).
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naturalist drama. But it was the all-woman Dionysian dance scene that
lent the play that startling burst of manic energy (all the more striking for
being so alien to its overarching naturalist ambience) that mesmerized audi-
ences and critics alike. The Irish midland settings in Carr’s plays also osten-
sibly recall the old naturalist drama, but her characters display extremes of
squalor, depravity, and psychotic behavior violently at odds with the more
restrained politesse of the older naturalism. McDonagh’s Leenane Trilogy
inhabits a similar territory, but his is a more self-consciously darkened-down
but also camped-up and comic world comprised of collages of the older
naturalist conventions, settings, and formulas. In fiction, McCabe’s Butcher
Boy also pushes naturalism in the same comic-grotesque direction. In that
novel, the conventional realistic depiction of a depressed small Irish town is
transformed by filtering the narrative through the deranged Francie’s apoca-
lyptic imagination, in which Irish Catholic and British and American forms
of pop-culture millenarianism promiscuously commingle. By this means, the
more familiar naturalistic renditions of the rickety end of de Valera’s Ire-
land intersect with and are aggravated and quickened by Cold War night-
mares of nuclear catastrophe and Catholic fantasies of the end of the world.
The result is an eclectic tragicomic vision of disintegration that inserts the
national sense of an ending into a wider global one.
It is difficult to know at this early stage how best to diagnose the
significance of this emergent aesthetic trend. On the one hand, the new
neonaturalism would seem to signal a decisive disintegration of a funda-
mental paradigm of postindependence culture: the once dominant natu-
ralist aesthetic is not displaced by some new aesthetic agenda, however;
instead, the old naturalism is denaturalized by pushing its typical content
and conventions to violent or kitschy extremes. In other words, the works of
Carr, McDonagh, McCabe, and (in the different context of the North) Bate-
man and MacLiam Wilson continue to exploit the same emotional territories
charted by the earlier naturalists, but they do so with a kind of formal eclecti-
cism and hectic bravura alien to the older forms. Their neonaturalism might,
on the one hand, be read positively as an objective correlative of the con-
temporary condition: a period of exuberant social flux that cannot, however
hectically it bids to do so, dispel the traumaticmemory of the past fromwhich
it wishes to escape. Alternatively, it might just as plausibly be argued that
these works represent an essentially superficial renovation of an old aes-
thetic—a naturalism on steroids is still naturalism—since the formal experi-
ments remain shackled to the same dystopian, entropic, naturalist world-
view. Where the thematic content of the once-dominant older naturalism
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was radical but its form and treatment conservative, the new neonaturalism
might be said simply to reverse this ratio: the fundamental conception and
diagnosis of Irish society rehearsed in the new neonaturalism is very familiar
indeed, the formal experimentation a desperate last-ditch attempt, perhaps,
to lend that inherited content a spurious radicalism.
The contemporary Irish literary field, then, is structured by the inter-
section of a number of distinct aesthetic modes and agendas. An estab-
lished literary naturalism, identified primarily with some of the now senior
reputations in Irish fiction such as McGahern, O’Brien, Friel, Murphy, and
the late Brian Moore, and with a host of lesser figures, remains a dominant
though seemingly declining force. A newer neonaturalist narrative aesthetic,
associated primarily with a younger generation of writers, has recently
emerged to challenge, though also in some ways thematically to sustain
and prolong that dominance by other means. The canonical figures of Irish
modernism—Wilde, Synge, Yeats, Joyce, and Beckett—continue to tower
like a literary Mount Rushmore over the contemporary scene. The belated
legatees to this older modernism, such as Thomas Kinsella, Derek Mahon,
Trevor Joyce, and Catherine Walsh, now operating in unseasonable condi-
tions almost wholly inhospitable to modernism, have found themselves side-
lined by a critical establishment more preoccupied with writers whose styles
represent late-lyrical versions of naturalism—such as Seamus Heaney or
Michael Longley—orwith thosewhoseworks appearmore easily accommo-
dated to wider postmodernist international currents—such as John Banville,
Paul Muldoon, and Medbh McGuckian. Distinctions between these belated
modernist and postmodernist agendas seem increasingly hazardous and
unstable, in any event, because in the period since World War II modernism
generally has surrendered both its vanguardist faith in the transfigurative
power of art and its ‘‘mandarin’’ commitment to encyclopedic and autotelic
works of art that aspired to become hieratic texts to an entire culture.28
Even as the achievements of the major modernists recede in time,
therefore, and even as their works lose some of their initial power to shock as
they become embalmed and institutionalized by the university and heritage
industries alike, they continue—because of the grand scale of their ambi-
tion, radical integrity of their vision, and scope of their erudition—to over-
shadow all subsequent achievements. However much contemporary Irish
literature may aspire to outflank or leave modernism behind, therefore, it still
28. The major exception is Thomas Kinsella. While a veritable critical industry has
emerged around Heaney, Kinsella’s work has received much less sustained attention and
has even been excluded from some recent anthologies.
238 boundary 2 / Spring 2004
languishes in modernism’s wake. Works of some merit continue to appear
in all of the different aesthetic modes that intersect to constitute the cur-
rent Irish literary field, but truly significant change perhaps will require work
charged with ambition sufficient to disturb and reconfigure that whole liter-
ary field itself.
While modernism and naturalism may be at opposite ends of the
spectrum where the subject of verisimilitude or representational realism is
concerned, in an Irish context they have both been institutionally processed
in terms of their apparently shared antagonism to what is commonly char-
acterized as the Revival’s romantic ‘‘flight from reality.’’29 In the overarch-
ing context of the country’s integration into Europe and global capital, that
is, the social function served by each has proved largely complementary:
naturalism is generally lauded as the necessary gritty realistic corrective
to Revivalist romanticism and idealism; modernism is championed as the
aesthetic that best expresses the country’s post-sixties’ disdain for cultural
nativism and receptiveness to international modernity. For any new litera-
ture to emerge, a new cultural criticism capable of shattering this congealed
critical consensus (the literary critical outrider of modernization theory) will
also be indispensable.
6
The most decisive shift in contemporary Irish culture in recent de-
cades, therefore, is not that comprised by recent mutations within the liter-
ary field itself but rather the apparent displacement of literature tout court
from the central position it had occupied since the Revival. That Revival,
as I remarked earlier, was an overwhelmingly literary phenomenon whose
‘‘giants’’ were all writers. Contemporary Irish writing, even at its very best,
has produced no writers of comparable ambition, erudition, complexity, or
international stature, and in fact the most internationally distinguished and
consistently innovative figures of the contemporary Irish cultural scene at
present are not its writers but its singers and musicians. Given its popula-
tion and the size of its domestic market, Irish traditional, folk, and rock music
forms have enjoyed a remarkable presence on the domestic and global
music scene over the past several decades. Traditional music, once thought
a residual western seaboard phenomenon on the verge of extinction, has
witnessed a striking resurgence in recent decades—one that has secured
29. This description of the Revival is John Wilson Foster’s in Colonial Consequences:
Essays in Irish Literature and Culture (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1991), 50.
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its popularity at both the urban and rural community level—and it is now
the object of serious academic study as well. Irish folk music—drawing on
both Irish traditional and folk and wider international influences—has also
produced a whole series of figures, such as Luke Kelly, Donal Lunny, Andy
Irvine, Paul Brady, Dolores Keane, Christy Moore, Mairéad and Tríona Ní
Dhomhnaill, and many others, whose works have earned them a popular
domestic and international audience. Meanwhile, in the more high-profile
rock scene, Irish artists such as Van Morrison, Rory Gallagher, Bob Gel-
dolf, U2, Sinéad O’Connor, and the Pogues appear to have secured for
themselves a place in the history of international popular music that few of
their literary peers could claim in the history of contemporary international
literature.
The vitality of the contemporary Irish music scene is not something
that should be attributed to the Celtic Tiger boom period, which ought more
properly to be associated with the lip-synced pap of ‘‘boy bands’’ such as
Boyzone or Westlife. The roots of Irish music’s current success might be
traced back, rather, to the international folk revival of the 1960s, which cre-
ated an appreciative new international and domestic audience for Irish tradi-
tional and folk music, and to the concurrent abandonment by the state of its
attempt to generate an indigenous Irish musical ‘‘high culture’’ or ‘‘art music’’
by means of an arranged marriage of Irish folk and European classical tradi-
tions.30 Internationally, this was also a period when, in Derek Scott’s phrase,
postmodernism ‘‘ousted [modernist] notions of universalism, international-
ism and ‘art for art’s sake,’ and replaced them with concerns for the values of
specific cultures and their differences.’’31 For Scott, the belief in a universal
aesthetic that transcends social and cultural context lay behind the inter-
nationalist aspirations of musical modernism; this aspiration has been dis-
placed, he contends, since the sixties, by a postmodern cultural relativism,
signaled both by a resurgent interest in ‘‘ethnicmusic’’ (and the rise of ethno-
musicology) and the increasing similarity in the marketing techniques used
for the classical and pop music repertoires.
In the space opened by these developments, a whole series of Irish
individuals and groups, practicing very diverse musical styles, emerged.
These included traditional and folk groups such as Planxty, the Bothy Band,
Ceoltóirí Cualann, the Chieftains, De Danann, and Altan, and bands such as
30. See Marie McCarthy, Passing It On: The Transmission of Music in Irish Culture (Cork:
Cork University Press, 1999), chap. 6.
31. Derek Scott, ‘‘Postmodernism and Music,’’ in The Icon Critical Dictionary of Postmod-
ern Thought, ed. Stuart Sim (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 135.
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Horslips, Moving Hearts, Scullion, Clannad, and the Pogues, who pioneered
experimental syntheses of international rock and traditional Irish arrange-
ments. In the works of early rock groups such as the Boomtown Rats and
later bands and individuals such as U2, the Undertones, the Cranberries,
and Sinéad O’Connor, the international rock element vastly outweighs any
indigenous Irish sound or form. What is important here, however, is not
the listing of individual artists and groups but the fact that a critical mass
of musical talent, working domestically in a sustained manner over sev-
eral decades, and in a variety of fields from traditional through classical to
punk, has produced a music that has engaged and extended, rather than
simply disowned, its indigenous heritage. In the Pogues’s sometimes rau-
cous, sometimes lyrical, blending of London punk and Irish folk, in collabo-
rations such as that between Van Morrison and the Chieftains, in Sinéad
O’Connor’s haunting renditions of traditional ballads, in the heterogeneous
versions of ‘‘Celtic rock’’ developed from Horslips to Clannad to Moving
Hearts, as well as in the works of a host of individual composers, singer-
songwriters, and musicians, local and international forms have achieved
creative interaction.
In a country in which literary critics monopolize cultural debate and in
which specialists in European classical music dominate the academic study
of music at the university level, the sociocultural significance of this quite
dramatic musical ‘‘renaissance,’’ which has now extended in multiple direc-
tions over several decades, has received astonishingly little critical analy-
sis.32 It would be tempting to construe the phenomenon as a kind of latter-
day version of the earlier Revival period, as both moments have involved
productive critical encounters between local materials and wider interna-
tional experiments and styles (as well, inevitably, as producing a good deal
of ‘‘cod celticism’’). Yet while the comparison is common, the analogy is
ultimately misleading, since the differences between the two moments and
phenomena are as significant as any similarities. The most successful Irish
writers to emerge from the late nineteenth-century Revival were committed
to a high modernism in which cultural production was directed, to use Pierre
Bourdieu’s terms, toward the field of restricted production, where the accu-
mulation of long-term symbolic capital was prized above short-term eco-
nomic profit. Thus, while works such as Ulysses or Waiting for Godot may
32. See Patrick Zuk, ‘‘Music and Nationalism,’’ Journal of Music in Ireland 1 (January/
February 2002): 5–9. Irish feminist cultural criticism seems no less restrictively tied to the
written word. Irish academic feminism has still to produce a single major study of contem-
porary Irish women musicians, singers, or composers.
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have freely drawn on mass culture, these were nonetheless formally inno-
vative, oblique, vanguardist texts that resisted capitulation to ‘‘the culture
industry,’’ though their formal difficulty also steered them toward a restricted
highly educated elite audience. For the most part, however, the works pro-
duced by themost internationally feted artists to have emerged from the cur-
rent Irish musical ferment are aimed at what Bourdieu calls the field of large-
scale cultural production: that is, at the more popular end of the market that
literary modernism resisted.33 Indeed, those individuals and groups, such as
U2 most notably, that attained the most spectacular success have become
themselves microversions of multinational enterprises complete with their
own extended staff, public relations and image development teams, not
to mention multimillion turnovers and investment profiles. In the industrial
structures of the music industry, business people play a more decisive role
than any aesthetic mediators (fellow practitioners, critics, music historians)
in key production decisions. Considerations about what or what not to pro-
duce are based less on personal feedback from artistic peers or audiences
than on electronic techniques of market research, and considerations such
as whether the musical product will accommodate the needs of other media
outlets such as radio and television take precedence over the independent
choices of the musicians. This capitalization of culture may not be entirely
new (and it is much more extensive in rock than in the traditional, folk, or
classical strands of the current ferment, which are often mediated to the
public through quite different circuits), but when cultural production takes
corporate form, the interplay between capital and culture is certainly inten-
sified to entirely unprecedented levels.
Thus, as the Irish cultural field has been expanded and reconfigured
in the last two decades, so too has its weight undoubtedly shifted toward
corporatized forms of cultural production and consumption, the operations
and consequences of which Irish cultural critics, mesmerized by the ‘‘great
leap forward’’ of the Celtic Tiger, havemostly ignored. But while this situation
clearly calls for something more than the kind of dizzy Disneyfied excite-
ment and self-congratulation that has characterized so much Irish cultural
criticism of late, something more rigorous than bargain-basement-standard
Adornean diatribes about commercialization or the culture industry is also
required. The capacity to produce a radical Irish culture critically responsive
to the demands of the new global conjuncture has by no means been elimi-
nated, though the conditions, circuits, and modalities through which it might
flourish need constantly to be reimagined, cultivated, and renovated.
33. See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘‘The Market of Symbolic Goods,’’ Poetics 14 (1985): 13–44.
